Yep, the Budapest Memorandum. Prior to the current government and contingent, of course, on Russia providing Ukraine with sovereignty and security assurances from (as source notes), UK, US, and Russia.

Naturally, Russia reneged on their side of the agreement.

Numerous sources suggest it has been in consideration by the Biden camp since mid November. I suppose we’ll see.

Personally I don’t think there’s too much to really glean that Russia doesn’t already have and know regarding our nuclear ICBMs. I’d argue the patriot missile system or especially Aegis defense system are far more valuable secrets — the former already being in Ukraine. After all, both nations know how to build ICBMs, MIRVs, and nuclear warheads. Interception thereof is another matter.

I’d be open to Biden providing the recipe and supplies for Ukraine to build their own, but the immediate need to have one now before Trump assumes office puts a time crunch on this.

Ukrainian lives are on the line. I simply do not want Ukraine to be defenseless against an emboldened Russia for the next 4 years without having a deterrent.

How do you think nukes work that one can just be provided to them?

How do you think nukes work that this is obstacle that cannot be overcome by two innovative powers?

Are you familiar with the Sentinel ICBM launched by vertical-erected launchers?

And how do you feel they will implement MAD with only a single nuke?

It’s not black-and-white, but rather a gradient: One threatening Moscow is better than none; more is better than one.

Now let me ask you: Why (if this is indeed your belief) do you think such a proposed scenario invites more risk than the current scenario Ukraine is in now while unarmed? Moreover do you believe Russia would have invaded Ukraine if Ukraine did not adhere to the Budapest Memorandum?

I am amicable to this as well. I wrongfully thought that Article 5 of NATO prohibited someone engaged in an active war from joining, but that appears to be incorrect and more unwritten / traditional. The nice thing with my proposal is that Biden could, to my knowledge, unilaterally do this without requiring other NATO members to endorse.

I’ll give you two responses then; one brief, one not so brief that explains my thought process for the closure of this discussion.

1. Okay. Have a nice rest of your day.

2. Who knew geopolitics is complicated and cannot be distilled to bite-sized brevity? Wouldn’t it be convenient if this all fit on a 3x5 index card? I put effort into my comments and especially when I generally have respect for the person with whom I’m discussing.

Let’s cut to the chase. In such discussions, we basically have 3 options:

• Cooperatively and mutually pursue the truth and enlightenment. (e.g., “Yeah that’s possible and I agree with A and B, but I think…”)
• I convince you of my position.
• You convince me of your position.

You’re not venturing down a path that is convincing to me, and I’m apparently not convincing you with my strategy — either because (a) my transmission is poor, (b) reception is poor, or © I’m wrong and cannot see it. But unfortunately the arguments presented to me have not been compelling for me to see better logic.

Ultimately that you perceive me to be gish gallloping and I perceive you to be sealioning me means this discussion has been exhausted. I have no problem with healthy skepticism; but when you’re trying to deflect sound reasoning (at least uncontested) by requests of evidence that aren’t even necessary but rather proven by logic itself (what “reputable” military strategist DOESN’T use probability and proportionality in risk assessment!???), then that to me signals lazy posturing than it does healthy skepticism . You see the problem is you aren’t just remaining a neutral skeptic; you’re taking the opposite stance but not backing up your position in any remote way — neither with evidence, nor logic & reason I have at least done — that your position is the less risky of the two proposals.

So I suppose with that we leave it here and I’ll oblige you with the last word. Have a nice day.

Okay, come on man… You can either begin to sealion me or you can engage in good faith we can have a healthy discussion as adults. Since I’m putting quite a bit of effort in this conversation and not getting anything in return but denial — there really isn’t anything in this conversation for me unless something changes and quickly.

That is,

• You aren’t substantively responding to my points.
• You aren’t even entertaining a rational counter-argument, but engaging again in Sea-lioning.
• If unfamiliar with the term, you ask many questions, I provide direct responses; the substance of those responses remain uncontested and you move the goalpost with further questions (the key point, without acknowledgement or discussion of the preceding questions and responses).

But hey, if you want to play that game I can play it, too:

• Can you show me the well-respected military strategists who support you in this? Who think illogically and not in terms of risk and probability?

• What in my scenario is actually unreasonable. Do you believe that is unreasonable, and if so, why?

• Why do you believe M.A.D. theory would not hold up in this case and that the relative risk of Scenario 2 is greater than Scenario 1?

But sure, finally, I can give you an example: General LeMay and Robert McNamara responsible for the successful bombing of Japan, both by conventional and nuclear means. They employed risk calculus both in terms of their own bombers versus the relative risk to the opposition. This is pretty standard MO.

To be fair, it wouldn’t be the first time radioactive dust blanketed Europe because of Russia by indirect means. Small-yield tactical nukes would also be less of an issue and an escalatory stepping-stone that is textbook for Putin.

What I seem to think is that military strategists think in terms of cold calculus of sunk cost and numbers; so let’s play this out:

• Russia drops one tactical nuke on Ukraine.

• The world gasps and shudders in horror.

• Trump looks the other way, promoting “America First” Isolationism in political expediency.

• Russia says they’ll consider dropping more if not for the unilateral surrender of Ukraine.

• Western European military advisors say, “Yes, radioactive fallout is going to cover parts of Europe, but one small-yield tactical nuke isn’t too bad. Maybe we can prevent further damage because if we were to respond by conventional or nuclear means against Russia, they will certainly be able to deploy a sizable amount of their total nuclear arsenal and naturally the deaths from WW3 would be higher than some radioactive dust.”

This is how they think. It’s rational. But Putin knows this.

… This is why you give Ukraine, the actual active victim here just enough nuclear weapons to threaten Putin’s ivory towe on the eve of his political puppet entering the White House in the USA no less. It puts Putin in a bind and it safeguards Ukraine via M.A.D. Theory.

It’s not moot at all. With that comment, you’re basically saying Russia could do any irrational thing at all, so why stop with a nuke? Maybe they’ll spray anthrax spores across all of Ukraine too. Maybe they’ll send a hoard of plague rats. Maybe they’ll crash all of their satellites into Ukrainian territory for good measure. Why not?

By this rationale, let’s just assume Russia will do random bad stuff. Because. And if that’s the case, why would Ukraine having a nuke themselves give them pause?

Because a desperate bully targets the weak and defenseless. Always has. None of those threats are as sizable as the nuclear threat, and giving Ukraine a proverbial “trump card” to level the playing-field in terms of risk to Putin himself is the only shot at injecting a dose of self-preservation in Putin’s mind. After all I hope we don’t tell our kids to not punch the bully back because hopefully a bystander will come to their aid eventually after the damage is already done.

Look at the end of the day, you are presented with two risks, and ask yourself which is more likely:

• 1. Putin to utilize nukes while he has an ally in the White House for the next 4 years against a non-nuclear armed enemy.
• 2. Or Ukraine proactively utilizing a nuke that itself would spell their own doom.

Personally, I’d much rather exchange more risk with Scenario 2 in order to further mitigate risk of Scenario 1.

Russia is hemorrhaging losses themselves while their economy on a war time footing cannot sustain this in perpetuity; after all a smaller Soviet-Afghanistan war contributed to the over-toppling of the mightier USSR — mostly along economic lines. They need an off-ramp themselves, and fairly quickly. To suggest the country that has continued to escalate war crimes in Ukraine would suddenly stop escalating — especially now having a key ally in who was once their largest geopolitical threat — I think is somewhat naive.

Putting myself in the shoes of a psychopath like Putin, you’re gauging how far you can push the limit on the geopolitical stage. Would I want to end this conflict sooner than later and decisively? Would I not be praised domestically as a hero who vanquished a foreign adversary? Yes. Is it likely I’ll ever actually conquer Kyiv by conventional means if the first months failed with my forces at their strongest? No. Could I get away with a nuke under Biden? Probably not. Could I with Trump? Probably yes.

To ask what would that gain for Russia is kind of moot in my view because ultimately, Russia has already lost far more than they’ve gained in waging this conflict. Their economy is in tatters; their armies exposed as weak and incompetent and crippled. What geopolitical status they had in the West before has completely washed away. Sure they gained something like 17-19% of land including Crimea, but they’ll be suffering for decades to come. This is mostly about legacy and vengeance for the cold war in the eyes of Putin and that’s reflected in his own essay and the Foundations of Geopolitics.

Either way, the threat is enough that has deterred the West from engaging in conventional defense of Ukraine. I’d say that’s concerning enough to warrant provision of a handful of nuclear missiles to Ukraine to serve as a direct deterrent. Ideally one would simply move these nukes into Ukraine and then reveal to Putin that they have already been put in place and ready to respond. Again, the goal is deterrence of course.

Edit: Let’s not forget that Putin recently escalated yet again, using an inert MIRV intermediate ballistic missile whose payload would normally contain multiple nuclear warheads. (the first documented use of a MIRV in combat, apparently).

Of course. It’s just a curious comment section that shifts to a falsely equivalent whataboutism fallacy when the subject-matter at hand given the submission is a very present and documented danger. I of course would not be opposed to anyone submitting data that they or someone else gathers for male victims of female perpetrators, too.

Respectfully, I believe I do understand your point and I’ll try to echo your side to verify that; but you may not be understanding mine.

What I believe your point is: If we give Ukraine nukes now, the future leadership could be volatile, thereby increasing the net-volatility of the region.

However, let’s consider what I view as reasonable assumptions at the geopolitical level, both now and into the future:

• If say, 4 years from now or whenever Zelenskyy (still overwhelmingly popular in Ukraine) steps down, the future leadership of Ukraine becomes volatile, then MAD theory still works symmetrically; after all, Russia clearly has many more nukes than Ukraine and that spells their destruction.

• Practically-speaking, Ukraine geopolitical inertia has moved heavily toward the orbit of the West and its humanitarian values.

• If future Ukrainian leadership is unstable, it is therefore reasonable to assume that they are likely Russian-centric and sympathetic; therefore, they would be unlikely to unilaterally and proactively attack Russia.

• We trust Ukraine NOW. We trust Zelenskyy NOW.

• The risk of Russia launching nuclear attacks against Ukraine during Trump’s administration is orders of magnitude greater than the risk in the preceding years going back to 2014.

• Therefore, we should be far more concerned about the immediate, real danger Russia poses to Ukraine as opposed to the speculative danger of future hypotheticals down the road that — in my opinion — do not hold water given the aforementioned geopolitical climate. When Russia and North Korea already have nukes and are a global threat, I really am not concerned about the small Ukrainian country who is currently fighting the good fight on behalf of all of us. Seems to be putting the cart before the horse.

Perhaps not; however:

1. This is practically speaking only reinstating the Budapest Memorandum given Russia’s failure to comply.

2. It is very probable he remains in power over the next 4 years, which are the most pivotal 4 years of Ukraine’s future and most dire period for nuclear threat against them.

For the record, you still haven’t actually addressed the logic at hand. You simply keep, wrongly, suggesting there are limits where one can apply game theory when MAD of the Cold War is almost by definition textbook Game Theory.

To your Ad Hominem, honestly, I don’t particularly desire to be around most of them all that much either so it works out. I have my loved ones and I’m content. Go to your parties and drink; leave geopolitics to me I guess?

Bonus history lesson:

The first mathematical discussion of the prisoner’s dilemma appeared, and an experiment was undertaken by mathematicians Merrill M. Flood and Melvin Dresher, as part of the RAND Corporation’s investigations into game theory. RAND pursued the studies because of possible applications to global nuclear strategy.[15]

I see a curious and complete lack of substantive response after I already elucidated with Game Theory (That you equate this to “game” suggests you don’t actually understand what Game Theory is) the options at hand.

Ergo, my point still remains wholly intact.

Neither side is sane.

and:

Ukraine is a pawn. Zelenskyy doesn’t matter at all.

Let me just stop you there. I’m not interested in deep state qnon conspiracy theory lizard people arguments. These are literal Kremlin talking-points.

Get the fuck out, Putin apologist. I have no room for entertaining MuH BoTh SideS bullshit.

But I’m not interested in nuclear war and MAD only works when both sides are sane. Does anyone look sane right now on either side?!

Herein lies the ill-logic of your belief set. You’re not really exploring the Game Theory, here.

IF both sides are not sane (Putin), then it still stands as a credible argument to arm the sane side (Zelenskyy), for like you said, what is stopping insanity from attacking a defenseless victim? After all, through time immemorial the bully targets the defenseless, but second-guesses when they can get smacked back.

Moreover your argument only holds water under the false assumption that the insane doesn’t yet have nukes either… But in this instance they of course already do.

What we DO KNOW about authoritarian tyrants like Putin — as exemplified by his extremely long table during COVID — is that they are terrified of death and seek not to be a ruler of rubble. Thus, when Putin sees that Zelenskyy has unilateral power to launch a retaliatory strike against Moscow, then that would indeed cause even the insane psychopath to reconsider. After all, what else is lost? Absolutely nothing.

Red-pilled incel rhetoric really seems to run rampant 'round these parts.

Exactly. I say fuck Putin’s red line and give Ukraine nukes to deter Russia unilaterally.

If surrounding nations are unwilling to commit conventional ground forces or establish a No-Fly-Zone over Ukraine for risk of escalation, can we really count on them to respond effectively should tactical nukes or worse be used by Russia against Ukraine? I think not.

One would hope, but those are mere promises. When the time comes, doing is far different than saying. If we’re already committed that far and we already support Ukraine to those ends, then let’s cut out the middle man and give Ukraine such missiles themselves where they may be utilized immediately without hesitation. And of course, that’s a certainty Putin can be assured of.

we do live in a climate where men are seen exclusively as current and temporarily embarrassed perpetrators, and less so as fellow victims.

All due respect, but where is your evidence because the way I see it is this (male here btw):

• Men perpetrate the vast majority of homicides.
• Men overwhelmingly control the vast majority of wealth and power positions, globally.
• Men are responsible for the vast majority of wars throughout history.
• Men are responsible for the majority of physical domestic violence cases — particularly those leading to homicide.
• Is there anywhere in the world where men are oppressed by women the way women are in, say, Afghanistan or Iran or Russia (legalized domestic violence)?

The data in the UK probably doesn’t exist because the instances are that much more rare. I’m open to being wrong, but until numbers are brought to the table, we’re talking data vs. speculation. What we do know is that Men account for 85-95% of convicted homicides, globally, making an outsized number relative to the portion that they are victims (somewhere around 75%). Of this subset, the most rare scenario is a male victim and female perpetrator.

There are of course instances of women murdering men and those should not be downplayed; but let’s neither invoke a false equivalence fallacy.